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Abstract
In alternative unentangled based cryptosystem,
classical channel can not be used when the system
is protected by no-cloning principle. But for the
similar security criteria , it is shown that classi-
cal channel can be used in alternative entangled
based quantum cryptosystem. A prototype of con-
ventional entangled based cryptosystem is recovered
from alternative entangled based cryptosystem, but
such recovery is not possible from alternative un-
entangled based cryptosystem. We conclude that
entangled based cryptosystem is superior than un-
entangled based system.
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Apart from security reason, study on quantum cryptography
[1,2] is always important. One of such study is the comparative
study on EPR and non EPR cryptosystem. This is essentially a
study on entanglement vs unentanglement in a particular situation.
Bennett, Brassard and Mermin [3] comparatively studied con-
ventional EPR and non EPR cryptosystems. They concluded that
these two cryptosystems are same in a sense which type is be-
ing used can not be distinguished by others. It follows if sender
uses EPR protocol and dishonestly tells it non EPR then receiver
also can not verify it. In that sense two cryptosystems are indis-
tinguishable. It is recently understood conventional quantum bit
commitment protocol completely fails [4, 5] because of this indistin-
guishability of two system. Therefore Bennett et al’s work becomes
helpful to examine other cryptographic task. Their work was based
on conventional cryptography. Recently alternative non EPR and
EPR protocols have been proposed [6,7]. Many conclusions drawn
from conventional quantum cryptography do not hold good in al-
ternative quantum cryptography. So a fresh comparative study is
necessary.
It is revealed that our unentangled based crytosystem uses mixed
quantum state to encode a bit value but our entangled based sys-
tem uses many pure entangled state for the same. Two systems can
be distinguished by the receiver. Despite these dissimilarities, they
have many similarities. Both can operate on entirely any type of
quantum channel. Both provide quantum authentication. In both
the system key can carry meaningful information. Eavesdropper’s
problem is similar for both systems. Bit commitment encoding is
possible [8] for both systems. A single bit can be made secure with-
out producing other bits in the two systems.
Still the two systems are not well understood. We have seen
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that classical channel can not be used in non EPR system when
bit by bit security is sought. This means cryptosystem becomes
complete quantum cryptosystem in this security criteria. But we
do not know whether same is true for EPR system. We also do not
know whether conventional cryptography or its prototype can be
recovered from these alternative systems or not. Here we shall see
that on these two questions two cryptosystems dier.
Consider a source emits pairs of spin 1/2 particle in their singlet
state. One particle of each pair is flying towards Alice and its alter
ego towards Bob. Let us assume that each n pairs reveal one bit of
information. Alice and Bon secretly share the information of two
sequences of measurements. Suppose two sequences of direction of
spin-measurements are:
Sn0 = {Px Px Py Py Px Py Py Py Px Px Py Px......} and
Sn1 = {Py Px Px Px Py Py Px Py Py Py Px Px......}, where 0 and 1 in
the subscripts stand for bit values and Px and Py are two orthogo-
nal directions of measurements.
Suppose they jointly decide bit values. The bit values can be
decided when both of them use the same sequence of measure-
ments. To produce a key both use S0 and S1 at random on their
own sequences of EPR particles. When both use S0 or S1, the cor-
responding results will be perfectly correlated. But if one use S0
and other S1 or vice versa, the results will not be perfectly corre-
lated. So 50% bit value choices are discarded (the discarded bits
can be used if they do not want to jointly decide the bit values).
The remaining 50% bits form the key. They reveal results through
classical public channel to form the key.




























their data sets contain perfectly correlated data. All the correlated
data sets are unrejected and contain random numbers. Therefore
in the public channel Eve will get many strings of random numbers.
This will not be anyway helpful.
Eavesdropper’s problem is to know the secret code of measure-
ments. For simplicity, let us think they want to produce a single bit.
For simplicity let us think, only Bob’s particles are exposed to Eve.
She can directly or indirectly measures using her own sequence of
measurements. She gets a set of data from her measurements and
taps Alice’s set of data when Alice reveals the results. But these two
sets of data will neither reveal any bit information nor complete in-
formation of Alice’s choice of measurements. Now it’s Eve’s turn to
reveal the results. The results can not be perfectly correlated. But
this can be interpreted by Alice as a case of non-identical choice of
bit values. Note that in S0 and S1 there is a common subsequence
Sc. So if Alice does not get perfect correlation, she can check the
data corresponding to Sc. Irrespective of choice of sequences of
measurements, two sets of data corresponding to Sc will be always
perfectly correlated. This second test exposes eavesdropping. Still
it is not the last nail to eavesdropping.
The data are not secure because public channel is not authen-
ticated channel. Eve can impersonate. After Alice’s disclosure of
data, Eve impersonating as Bob can reveal "fake data" correlating
with Alice’s data. Same thing she can do with Bob’s data im-
personating as Alice. Note that this attack works only for "fake
correlation". But in their 50% bit value choices, the data are not
perfectly correlated. Only their reduced data sets corresponding to
Sc are perfectly correlated. So initially if they do not get perfect
correlation between their data sets, they will get perfect correlation
in the reduced subsets. As Sc is hidden in S0 and S1, Eve could not
generate "fake less correlated" data with perfectly "fake correlated"
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sub set of data. This task she can leave for the legitimate users. It
seems that system fails.
There is a rescue. Note that "fake correlation" attack works as
both of them reveal all the data of the same events. The "fake cor-
relation" can not be produced if they don not reveal any data. But
the data has to be revealed if the system is to run. If they do not
reveal all the results of the same events, yet the system can work
but "fake correlation" attack will not work. For clarity, suppose
they divide the results of each set into two sets. Alice’s subsets are
RA1 and R
A
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1 . As EPR data sets are not revealed so "fake correla-
tion" attack can not work.
To create many bits (at least n+1 bits because they have shared
n bits), the above produce has to be repeated. This ensures bit by
bit security. If any bit is found corrupted the next bit will not be
produced. They reject S0 and S1 and may try with another two
shared sequences.
Is it possible to recover existing quantum cryptography from
alternative quantum cryptography and vice versa ? To answer this
query, the basic dierence of the two systems should be understood.
In conventional cryptography, a single pure state or single pure en-
tangled state represent a single classical bit (0 or 1) or two classical
bits (01 or 10). On the other hand in alternative quantum cryptog-
raphy, many states represent a single classical bit. The key of the
conventional cryptosystem does not carry meaningful information
but it does carry meaningful information in alternative cryptosys-
tem. Therefore recovery of alternative system from conventional
system is not possible. But if we can produce pure state bits which
does not carry any meaningful information from alternative system
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then at least recovery of prototype of conventional system, if not
the same system, will be possible.
We have two options - recovery of conventional EPR system
from alternative EPR system and conventional non EPR system
from alternative non EPR system. The former can be easily real-
ized in alternative EPR system. We have seen that when both of
them use S0 or S1, the data are perfectly correlated. These two set
of data can make a key provided they are not revealed. Suppose
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results of same instances( which events will be chosen to construct









2 or Alice reveals R
A
2 Bob
reveals RB2 . Both go through the correlation tests, If correlation is
found they know their chosen bit value and side by side they know
the unrevealed sets RA3 and R
B
3 contain perfectly correlated data.
To construct R3, it is better to use the data corresponding to Sc so
that they always get perfectly correlated data even when they use
non-identical sequences of operators. Continuing the process two
dierent kind of keys can be produced - the key does not exist even
in the mind of users and other key always exist in the mind of users.
If they want to produce only the former type they can share only a
single sequence instead of two. On same operation system can run.
This will be a sister protocol of conventional EPR cryptosystem.
From operational view point they are dierent otherwise they are
same.
The recovery of conventional non EPR system from alternative
system is not possible. A sequence of single photon polarized state
produces sequence of results. These results can represent bit value.
But if these results are revealed they can not be secure.
Why do these two systems respond dierently on these two is-
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sues ? The simple reason is that many EPR sequences generate
many, two-correlated strings of random numbers but many identi-
cal sequences of operations on many identical sequences of single
photon polarized states yield many strings of pseudo random num-
bers. Many sequences of single photon can yield many strings of
random numbers provided the input sequences are all random se-
quences or sequences of operations become always random. But
in our approach, neither we could use always random sequences of
single photon nor we could share many sequences of random op-
erations. That’s why classical channel can not be used to reveal
the results of dierent data sets those are pseudo-random numbers.
EPR cryptosystem is always good secure random number generator.
Throughout our discussion we have struck to bit by bit security.
If we do not want bit by bit security but want security of many bits
(meaningful) at a time, then such security needs to be proved. In
that scenario there may have a possibility of using authenticated
classical channel in non EPR type system. In that eventuality we
can say continuous use of classical channel and bit by bit security
are mutually exclusive in non EPR system.
In the comparative study, noise was not considered. Recently
we have presented noise[9] based unconditionally secure quantum
and classical cryptosystems. Therefore our alternative quantum
systems need not to be protected by bit by bit security. Some of
the dierences discussed above will vanish in the modied EPR and
non-EPR noise based protocols. Even the dierences between the
noise based quantum and classical cryptosystem belonging to our
alternative model, will sometime be blurred.
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